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Abstract 
THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP ENHANCEMENT AND INGROUP THREAT ON THE 
ANCHORING AND ADJUSTMENT HEURISTIC 
By Mattie V. Hedgebeth 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science 
at Virginia Commonwealth University 
Major Directors: Drs. Jeffrey D. Green and Jennifer A. Joy-Gaba 
Since its introduction in 1974, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic has been a topic of interest 
within the field of decision making. Although much work has examined factors that affect the 
process of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, very little has been studied about the self-
processes that may influence how individuals anchor. More specifically, self and ingroup 
motivations have yet to be explored. This research sought to identify whether an individual’s 
magnitude of adjustment from an anchor can be affected by either an enhancement or threat of 
the individual’s ingroup. I hypothesized that ingroup enhancing information would induce a 
smaller magnitude of adjustment from an experimenter-provided anchor and ingroup threatening 
information would induce a larger magnitude of adjustment from the anchor. I also hypothesized 
that ingroup identification would have a moderating effect on the relationship between type of 
anchor and magnitude of adjustment. The first study sought to establish the effect using Virginia 
Commonwealth University (VCU) students, using VCU as the ingroup. The second study sought 
to replicate these findings in novel groups in order to more rigorously test the hypotheses. 
Results suggested that whether an anchor is high or low affects how an individual adjusts from 
the anchor. There is also evidence that whether or not one’s ingroup is reflected by the anchor 
affects adjustment from the anchor. The hypothesized moderation effects did not emerge. 
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The Effects of Ingroup Threat on The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
Suppose that an individual was told that the length of the Mississippi River was 2,348 
miles long. Afterward, they were asked to estimate the length of the James river in Richmond, 
Virginia. Assuming that they know that the Mississippi River is one of the largest rivers in the 
world, they would likely adjust their estimate to be much smaller in length. This phenomenon 
whereby people use a cognitive heuristic to aid in their decision-making is called the anchoring 
and adjustment heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). Specifically, anchoring and adjustment 
is used when an individual is asked to make a judgement of a value under uncertainty and uses a 
previously known or presented value (anchor) to “adjust” their answer away from the anchor. 
Since the conception of this effect, there has been no work examining the role of self-relevant 
factors in the adjustment process. My research seeks to explore how these self-relevant factors, 
specifically ingroup bias and threat, can act as motivating factors in adjustment. 
A Two System Model 
 The use of heuristics, like the anchoring and adjustment heuristic, can be best understood 
through the lens of a two-system model known as dual process theory (Watson & Evans, 1974). 
Dual process theory conceptualizes thinking and decision-making in two systems: System 1, 
which is fast, automatic, intuitive, and unconscious, and System 2, which is slower, effortful, 
controlled, and conscious. Stanovich and West (2000) used these systems to categorize and label 
different cognitive processes. When there is a decision to be made, System 1 creates a highly 
accessible impression which will control the decision unless System 2 modifies or overrides that 
decision. These systems are described more in more detail by the Elaboration Likelihood Model 
(ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) of persuasion. In this model, System 1 is comparable to the 
peripheral route of persuasion, where unconscious and intuitive judgements about the 
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presentation of an argument, not necessarily the content. System 2 is comparable to the central 
route of persuasion where more complex analysis of an argument occurs. For example, suppose 
that an individual is presented with two speakers discussing an identical topic. One speaker is 
confident and attractive but presents a weak argument. The other speaker is not quite as attractive 
but is knowledgeable and presents a stronger argument. Through the peripheral route, the 
individual’s System 1 would likely believe the first speaker because of the positive impression 
made by their attractiveness and confidence. The second, more knowledgeable speaker would be 
more appealing to the central route of persuasion, which may only be activated if the topic and 
attitude were more central in importance (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). In sum, the deliberate 
control of System 2 would be much more analytical of the actual argument than System 1.  
 Because people often make decisions quickly, they do not always rely on deliberate 
processes whereby they can thoughtfully gather, consider, and evaluate information. Thus, in 
cases where individuals are asked to estimate unknown answers, they engage in mental shortcuts 
called heuristics. These heuristics exist mainly in System 1 but can also include parts of System 
2. Heuristics take an individual’s intuition from System 1 and use reasoning from System 2 to 
formulate the final answer. 
The Anchoring and Adjustment Heuristic 
Although there are several types of heuristics, my research focuses specifically on the 
anchoring and adjustment heuristic. This heuristic operates by having individuals use either a 
self-generated value or a previously provided and typically arbitrary number (anchor) to estimate 
the answer. For example, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) asked participants to provide the 
percentage of African nations in the United Nations. Participants then spun a “wheel of fortune” 
that included the numbers 0-100. Once the wheel had stopped, participants were asked to 
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indicate whether the percentage was higher or lower than the number spun and to estimate the 
true values by moving upward or downward from the given value. Although the number that 
they viewed from the wheel of fortune had nothing to do with the judgment they were asked to 
make, the number acted as an anchor on which they could use it to inform their estimate. In 
another example, Ariely, Lowenstein, and Prelec (2003) had participants to write down the last 
two digits of their social security number before asking participants how much they would be 
willing to pay for a series of items presented to them. Participants with higher social security 
numbers were shown to pay an average of $40 more than those with lower social security 
numbers.  
Types of Anchors 
In cases in which individuals are not given anchors, estimates can also be generated from 
an individual’s own knowledge base. For example, imagine that an individual was asked the 
question “When was the U.S. Constitution signed?” Though the answer is 1788, many people 
might respond somewhere close to the year 1776. This is because participants know that the 
Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776, therefore the signing of our Constitution must 
have occurred after the United States declared itself an independent nation. Thus, even though a 
specific anchor is not given, participants use their own information, received through various 
experiences. 
Aside from the larger categories of given and self-generated anchors, research has also 
focused on more nuanced categories of anchors. For example, intuitive anchors are synonymous 
with self-generated anchors in that the anchors are created from previous knowledge. Although 
individuals know these anchors are inaccurate, they still use them to reach the correct value. 
Intuitive anchoring involves high elaboration as it involves not only considering the true value 
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but drawing upon earlier knowledge and experience. For this reason, intuitive anchoring is not 
performed when individuals do not have the availability or cognitive capacity (Epley & Gilovich, 
2005).  
Another type of anchor utilizes the Best-and-Worst Case strategy (Epley & Gilovich, 
2009). As its name suggests, individuals either anchor upon the best-case-scenario or the worst-
case-scenario. In the best case, individuals tend to fall into planning fallacy (Beuhler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1994), in which tasks tend to take longer than estimated. This occurs because although the 
best-case scenario is the most accessible outcome, the most accessible outcome is not the most 
likely event (Morewedge, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2005). Moreover, individuals tend to focus more on 
their good intentions rather than past patterns (Koehler & Poon, 2006). On the other hand, worst-
case scenarios can also become anchors. For example, Rozenweig et al. (2009) found that when 
participants are informed of a plane crash, they tend to estimate much higher casualties but when 
they are motivated to be more accurate, they adjust much closer to the actual value.  
A third anchoring process includes the use of incidental anchors. These anchors are 
numbers that are encountered in the real world that effect an individual’s perception. Critcher 
and Gilovich (2008) found that participants were more willing to spend more at a restaurant 
named Bistro 97 than they were at Bistro 17. Although the number in the name of the bistros had 
nothing to do with the actual pricing of the menu, the number in the name of the bistro served as 
an anchor for the price of the food. The perception of anchors is also affected by environmental 
suggestion. In anchoring and adjustment research, the experimenter tries not to suggest that the 
anchor is the right answer, but in everyday life such as suggested values such as a suggested 
sentence from a lawyer (Englich & Mussweiler, 2001) seem credible and therefore seem like the 
correct value. Lastly, anchors can be affected by magnitude priming in which a general sense of 
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large or small can be primed. When asked to reproduce lines of either 1-inch or 3.5-inches, 
participants made higher estimates of the target value (Oppenheimer et al., 2008). 
Individuals also tend to use themselves and their own experience, or self-information, as 
an anchor when making judgements about others (Holyoak & Gordon, 1983). For example, 
Kruger (1999) explored how the Above Average Effect and anchoring and adjustment interact.  
In the above average effect, people view themselves as having more positive traits than the 
average person (Alicke & Govorun, 1995). In a series of studies, when participants were asked to 
compare themselves with their peers along different domains varying in difficulty, they based 
their judgements on their own skills rather than the comparison group. Kruger also noted that in 
this egocentric process, individuals tend to underweight the abilities of their comparison group 
and that this may be due to the abilities of the comparison group being relatively unknown, thus 
linking this egocentric weighing of skills to the anchoring and adjustment process. 
Individuals Adjustment from a Given Anchor 
The mechanism behind these incorrect estimates may explained by the Selective 
Accessibility Model (Strack, 1992). This model suggests that anchoring effects are mediated by 
an increase in accessibility of the anchor that is consistent semantic knowledge. For example, if 
an individual were to be asked if the average temperature last summer was higher than 90 
degrees prior to being asked what the actual average temperature was, they would likely bring to 
mind higher temperatures in recent summers.  
In order for the information that is made accessible by the anchor to be effective, it must 
both be applicable and representative. Information that is activated, but not applicable to the 
characteristics of the anchor is less likely to be used in the formulation of an estimate 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1997). Similarly, accessible information must be representative. That is, 
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information must be closely related to the anchor in order to be used in the judgement of the 
estimate (Strack, 1992). 
Extending from the selective accessibility model, Mussweiler and Strack (1999) found 
that participants seemed to solve comparative tasks by testing the possibility that the anchor is, in 
fact, the target value (i.e., the value participants are asked to determine after receiving the 
anchor). For example, if an individual was asked if there were more or less than five Star Wars 
movies, they would consider whether the answer was actually five before making their estimate.  
Likewise, Janiszewski and Uy (2008) showed that the precision of the anchor provided 
can also influence estimates. In five experiments, more precise anchors (e.g., 587) caused 
individuals to adjust less than those that appeared to be rounded (e.g., 500).  
Regardless of the type of anchor or how it is presented, individuals adjust insufficiently. 
As a result, individuals often estimate inaccurate numerical estimates (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). 
Earlier work suggested that insufficient adjustment is caused by satisficing, a process in which 
an individual stops adjusting when they believe they have reached a plausible value rather than 
continuing to what they would believe the most accurate answer is (Quattrone, 1982; Quattrone, 
Lawrence, Finkel, & Andrus, 1981).  
The Self  
The aim of this research is to seek out other self-driven factors that underly the anchoring 
and adjustment process as research and literature on the subject is sparse at best. Self-concept is 
not a singular experience and can be conceptualized as three different parts: the individual self, 
the relational self (e.g., the self in particular dyadic relationships, such as a romantic 
relationship), and the collective self (e.g., group identities, such as ethnicity or occupation) 
(Sedikides et al. 2013).  
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My focus is on the potential influence of a group or collective identity and how 
maintaining or enhancing its positivity might influence adjustment from an anchor. Membership 
in groups may be defined based on characteristics like gender, nationality, or mutual interests 
such as aerial arts and reading science fiction. When a person believes themselves to be a 
member of a group, that group is then defined as the person’s ingroup. Individuals typically have 
a host of ingroups based on a physical characteristic and/or interest. Groups that a person does 
not feel that they are a part of are called outgroups. 
Self-Protection and Self-Enhancement 
From the previous paragraphs, it is evident that the cognitive processes and nuances have 
been extensively studied. However, there has been little attention paid to how non-cognitive 
factors, like one’s self-concept and identity, can impact adjustments. Thus, it is possible that 
motivation to maintain a positive self may help explain how self-processes can influence 
adjustments from an anchor. Maintenance of the self is motivational, meaning that people defend 
(self-protection; Sedikides, Green, Saunders, Skowronski, & Zengel, 2016) and augment (self-
enhancement; Sedikides, 1993) themselves in various ways in order to maintain a positive view 
of themselves. Self-protection and enhancement can be achieved by seeking flattering feedback 
and disparaging the source of negative feedback and even more complicated processes such as 
selective memory (Sedikides et al, 2016). A common self-protection tactic, the “sour grapes 
effect” (Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002), occurs when an individual disparages a task or activity in 
which they were not successful. For example, consider an exercise enthusiast who decides to try 
yoga and struggles through the class. They then disparage the class, arguing that yoga is boring 
and inferior to other forms of exercise.  
Ingroup Bias and Ingroup Threat 
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 Because an individual’s ingroup is a large part of their identity, they use it to help define 
their collective self. Indeed, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) suggests that 
individuals strive for a positive self, with their self-concept being partly drawn from group 
membership. As a result, individuals tend to enhance and protect their ingroup as they would 
themselves. This, in part, is because individuals strive to maintain positive group identities. Thus, 
people make favorable evaluations to their own groups as opposed to outgroups, resulting in 
ingroup bias (Turner, 1975). Ingroup bias has been shown to increase under existential threat 
(e.g., Harmon-Jones et al., 1996) such as mortality salience (Castano et al., 2002). This increase 
in bias in reaction to threat regarding their ingroup may be more pronounced in individuals who 
have a stronger identification with their ingroup (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Grant, 1993; 
Verkuyten & Nekuee, 1998). My research seeks to tie these important issues of the self to the 
cognitive process of the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic.  
Overview of Study 1 
 The goal of this study was to explore how ingroup processes affect the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic. This research bridges two areas that have been separate: intuitive 
judgments such as heuristics, and self-processes. Indeed, research examining the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic has been almost entirely focused on “cold” cognitive processes; almost no 
work has examined the role of social, affective, and motivational processes. Relatedly, much of 
the work on anchoring and adjustment has involved random facts and values that may not have 
much relevance to the self. However, many everyday judgments relate to the self and these 
judgements may be affected by self-processes such as self enhancement. In other words, 
anchoring may also be influenced by maintaining a positive group identity. To test this question, 
participants were presented with college ranking information about either their own academic 
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institution, Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) or a fictional university, Turlington State 
University (TSU). Using a between-subjects design, participants were randomly assigned to 
either an Ingroup (VCU) or Outgroup (TSU) condition, then they viewed information that either 
enhanced their ingroup by providing an anchor to reflect a high college ranking or an anchor that 
threatened the reputation of their ingroup by reflecting lower college rankings. Likewise, 
participants viewing the outgroup viewed information about the fictional Turlington State 
University with anchors that described the outgroup positively or negatively. Participants were 
then asked to estimate the actual rankings for the institution and complete a series of 
questionnaires that assess ingroup-self overlap, attitudes about their ingroup, self-esteem, and 
self-presentation. 
The hypotheses for Study 1 were: 
• Hypothesis 1: When shown an anchor that threatens the reputation of one’s ingroup (i.e., 
a low anchor), individuals would adjust more from the given anchor than those who are 
shown the same anchor about an outgroup.  
• Hypothesis 2: When shown an anchor that enhances the reputation of one’s ingroup (i.e., 
a high anchor), individuals would adjust closer to the given anchor and adjust less than 
those who are shown the same anchor about an outgroup.  
• Hypothesis 3: Those who are shown an anchor that supports the reputation of their 
ingroup will adjust closer to the anchor than those who are shown an anchor that 
threatens the reputation of their ingroup. That is, the pattern of adjustment will support a 
higher ranking for the ingroup.  
• Hypothesis 4: Ingroup identification would moderate the magnitude of adjustment from 
the anchor. I hypothesized that individuals who feel that their ingroup is more central to 
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their sense of self would show a larger magnitude of adjustment away from the anchor 
when shown information that threatens their group and those that are shown information 
that enhances their group would adjust even closer to the anchor.  
Methods 
Study 1a 
 In order to assess the values of the anchors that would be used in Study 1b, a pilot study 
was conducted to better understand students’ estimation of each institutions ranking without an 
anchor.  
Participants 
Eighty-two participants were recruited both through Virginia Commonwealth University 
(VCU)’s SONA System and in VCU’s library. Data was collected using both online and paper 
questionnaires. All participants were undergraduate students at VCU. 
Method 
Participants were first asked about their knowledge of college ranking systems and asked 
to estimate the rankings of Virginia Commonwealth University and a fictional university, 
Turlington State University (TSU), compared to other colleges and universities in their 
respective states. In the case of VCU, participants were truthfully told that there are 171 
institutions within Virginia. For the fictional TSU, participants were told that there were 173 
institutions in its respective state1. After providing rankings, participants were asked how 
important college rankings were to them. For a complete list of questions, see Appendix A.  
Results 
 
1 No specific state was used to describe TSU. This was done so as to not influence students’ estimations 
of its rank. 
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In order to determine the anchors to be used in the subsequent study, the means and 
quartiles of both the VCU and TSU estimates were taken. The mean estimate for VCU’s rank 
was 42.89 (SD = 35.80) and the mean estimate for TSU’s rank was 70.95 (SD = 46.87). Results 
revealed that the upper quartile for the estimates of VCU’s rank was 75 and the lower quartile 
was 12. For TSU, the upper quartile was 100 and the lower quartile was 27.25. TSU’s upper and 
lower quartiles were used as the high and low anchors for the Study 1b. This is to ensure that 
both university estimates would be included within participants’ estimates for Study 1b. Thus, 
the anchors used in Study 1b were 30 in the low anchor conditions and 100 in the high anchor 
conditions. 
Study 1b 
Method 
Participants 
An a priori power analysis with a conservative power estimate of a small effect size 
(Cohen’s d = .30) revealed that 144 participants would be needed for adequate power (G-Power 
3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2007), 158 undergraduate students enrolled in 
introductory psychology courses at Virginia Commonwealth University were recruited through 
the SONA2 system. Twenty participants’ data were excluded because they did not follow 
instructions properly and did not adjust from the given anchor in the right direction, leaving 138 
participants (mean age = 18.98 years).  
Of the participants, 82.7% identified as women,15.8% identified as men, and one 
individual identified as transgender. In terms of racial diversity, 36% of participants were White, 
 
2 SONA is an online program that allows individuals from multiple psychology courses to participate in 
research in exchange for partial course credit.  
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28.9% were Black/African American, 20% of participants were Asian, 2.2% were Native 
American, and 0.7% were Pacific Islander.  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions using a 2 (Group: Ingroup, 
Outgroup) x 2 (Anchor: High, Low) between-subjects design. Because I sampled VCU students, 
the ingroup condition included information related to VCU. Participants in the ingroup condition 
viewed ranking information about VCU, whereas those in the outgroup condition viewed ranking 
information about a fictional university, Turlington State University. A fictional university was 
used as the control to lessen the possibility of confounding biases that may affect how 
participants responded. For example, if a participant had negative feelings toward a real 
university because their application to that university had been rejected, they may have 
responded with lower rankings as a result of their dislike of the university rather than as a 
response to the given anchor. The anchor factor included two levels – low and high. Participants 
in the low anchor condition were presented with a low ranking that suggested that the group 
described performed poorly, whereas the high anchor condition viewed information that 
suggested their group had high prestige.  
Procedure 
This study was conducted completely online using Qualtrics software through VCU’s 
SONA System. After providing informed consent, participants provided their student 
classification and how many years they had been at VCU. A complete questionnaire can be 
found in Appendix B. 
 Afterward, participants were shown a description of the college rating system and an 
explanation for how institutions earn their rankings. The description was as follows: 
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A top American business magazine releases an annual ranking of 4-year colleges and 
universities every year. This annual ranking is broken down by state so that each institution is 
ranked against other institutions in the same state. 
 Participants were then asked to complete the anchoring activity, with information from 
Study 1a providing the anchors. Participants in the high anchor (i.e., an anchor that positively 
reflects the ingroup or outgroup) condition were told that the institution had been ranked higher 
than 30 out of 171 among the colleges and universities in the institution’s state. Participants in 
the low anchor conditions were told that the institution about which they were shown 
information was ranked higher than 100 out of 171among the colleges and universities in the 
institution’s state. Participants in both conditions were then asked to estimate the actual rank of 
the university. After completing the anchoring activity, participants were asked their opinions of 
VCU or TSU (depending on their condition) and whether they were aware of college ratings. For 
a complete description of the manipulations, see Appendix C. 
Participants then completed a series of randomized questionnaires to measure traits 
potentially related to their rankings, including: The Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (SES; 
Rosenberg, 1989), Single-Item Narcissism Scale (SINS;  Konrath, Meier, & Bushman, 2014), 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1999), the Self-Affirming and 
Defensiveness subscales of the Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection scale (Hepper, Gramzow, 
& Sedikides, 2010), and Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC; Campbell et al., 1996). After 
completing these scales, participants completed the Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self (IIS; Tropp 
& Wright, 2001) and modified versions of the Ingroup Identification Measure (Hall & Crisp, 
2008) and Social Identification Questionnaire (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012). These scales 
were asked last to minimize reactivity from participants and prevent them from realizing the true 
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hypothesis. Finally, Participants were asked to complete an open-ended question to assess their 
understanding of the study’s purpose.  
Materials 
Student Information Questionnaire. As shown on Appendix B, Participants were asked to 
respond to questions regarding what year they started attending VCU, how many years they have 
attended VCU, their student classification, and their major.  
Trait Measures 
Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (SES; Rosenberg, 1989) is a 10-item scale 
that assesses an individual’s self-esteem. Sample items include “I feel that I have a number of 
good qualities” and “I take a positive attitude toward myself.” Respondents rate each item on a 
4-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly Agree). For a complete description, see 
Appendix D. 
Narcissism. Single-Item Narcissism Scale (SINS;  Konrath, Meier, & Bushman, 2014) is 
a well-validated, one item scale to assess narcissism, Participants were given a short definition of 
a narcissist and are asked to respond to the following statement; “To what extent do you consider 
yourself a narcissist?” on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me, 7 = very true of me). For the 
full measure, see Appendix E. 
Social Desirability. Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1999) 
is a 40-item scale designed to assesses an individual’s feelings about social desirability.  It is 
composed of two subscales – Self-Deception Enhancement and Impression Management. 
Sample items from the Self-Deception Enhancement and Impression Management subscales 
include “I am a completely rational person” and “Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke”, 
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respectively. This scale utilizes a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Totally Disagree, 7 = Totally 
Agree). For the full measure, see Appendix F. 
Self-Enhancement and Protection. The Self-Affirming Reflections and Defensiveness 
subscales of the Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection scale (Hepper, Gramzow, Sedikides, 
2010) was used to assess how individuals react to statements that affirm the self and defend 
against attacks to the self. The Self-Affirming Reflections subscale consists of six items while 
the Defensiveness subscale consists of 18 items. Respondents are asked to consider if the 
patterns and thoughts described in the items are activities that they engage in and how typical 
these actions are of them. Sample items from the Self-Affirming Reflections subscale include “In 
times of stress, thinking about your positive close relationships and loved ones” and “When you 
do poorly at something, reminding yourself of your values and what matters to you.” The 
Defensiveness subscale includes items such as “Revising very little for a test or going out the 
night before an exam or appraisal at work, so that if you do poorly, it would not mean you are 
incompetent.” Respondents use a 6-point Likert-type scale (1 = Not at all characteristic of me” 6 
= Very characteristic of me). For the full measure, see Appendix G. 
Self-Concept Clarity. Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC; Campbell et al., 1996) assesses 
the extent to which an individual’s beliefs about their self are clear, stable, and internally 
consistent. The scale is comprised of 12 items including “My beliefs about myself often conflict 
with one another” and “Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I would tell someone what I’m really 
like.” Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree). For the full measure, see Appendix H. 
Ingroup Identification Measures 
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Self-Ingroup Overlap. Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self (IIS; Tropp & Wright, 2001). The 
IIS was designed to assess the degree to which an individual’s ingroup is included in their self. 
Respondents are asked to circle one of seven images of overlapping circles best describes the 
interaction between their sense of self and their ingroup. For the full measure, see Appendix I. 
Ingroup Identification. Two measures were modified for the uses of this study. The 
Ingroup Identification Measure (Hall & Crisp, 2008) is a 4-item measure that assesses how much 
an individual identifies with their ingroup. Original items were modified to focus on the Virginia 
Commonwealth University community as the ingroup, for example, “I identify strongly with 
other VCU students.” For the full measure, see Appendix J. 
Social Identification. The Social Identification Questionnaire (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 
2012) is a 7-item measure designed to capture the degree to which an individual identifies with 
their social group as well as how they feel about their social group. Items were modified to 
reflect the VCU community with items such as “How central or marginal is being a student at 
VCU to your sense of who you are?” All items are rated on an 11-point scale (0 = 
Never/Extremely Marginal/Extremely Unhappy, 5 = Sometimes/Intermediate/Neutral, and 10 = 
Extremely Often/Extremely Central/Extremely Happy). For the full measure, see Appendix K. 
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were asked to respond to questions regarding 
their age, gender identity, racial identity, and ethnic identity.  
Results 
Calculation of Magnitude of Adjustment 
In order to calculate the magnitude of adjustment from the anchor, the mean adjustment 
from each condition was subtracted from the corresponding anchor. For example, if a participant 
was in the ingroup condition viewing the low anchor (100) and they estimated that VCU’s rank 
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was ranked 80, their magnitude of adjustment would be 20. Participants who viewed an anchor 
that positively portrayed their ingroup (VCU) adjusted an average of 12.18 higher than the 
anchor of 30 (SD = 8.08) while those who viewed an anchor (i.e., 100) that negatively portrayed 
their ingroup adjusted an average of 57.57 points higher than the anchor (SD = 26.49). On the 
other hand, those who viewed an anchor that negatively portrayed the outgroup (i.e., 100) 
adjusted a mean of 44.97 points away from the anchor (SD = 27.11) while those who viewed an 
anchor that positively reflected the outgroup (i.e., 30) adjusted a mean of 10.71 points higher 
than the anchor (SD = 7.56).  
Anchoring Effects 
In order to ensure that there was an anchoring effect, the mean estimate of each anchor 
level (low and high) were compared. Participants that were in the high anchor condition (i.e., an 
anchor of 30) estimated a mean rank of 18.72, whereas those who were in the low anchor 
condition (i.e., an anchor of 100) estimated a mean rank of 48.12 (See Table 1). Mean estimate 
significantly differed between the two anchors t(136) = 8.37, p < .001, d = 1.46. Taken together, 
these results confirm that that the anchoring effect was successfully replicated.  
Table 1 
Mean Estimate by Anchor 
Anchor N Mean Std. Deviation 
Low (100) 73 48.12 27.33 
High (30) 65 18.72 7.87 
 
The Effects of Anchor, Group, and Their Interaction 
A two-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to explore the 
effects of ingroup threat on the magnitude of adjustment away from an anchor. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of four conditions with the independent variables being the type of 
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anchor (negatively or positively reflecting the respective group) and type of group (ingroup or 
outgroup). There was a significant main effect of the type of anchor F(1, 138) = 133.60, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .50: when the anchor was described as high (positively portraying the group) or 
low (negatively portraying the group) affected how much higher individuals adjusted from the 
anchor (see Table 2). There was also a significant main effect of group F(1, 138) = 4.49, p = .04, 
partial η2 = .03: when the anchor was associated with the ingroup or outgroup affected how far 
participants adjusted higher than the anchor (see Table 3). There was no significant interaction 
between the type of anchor and group, F(3,138) = 2.28, p = .13, partial η2 = .02, suggesting that 
the adjustment from the anchor was not affected uniquely by both the type of group and type of 
anchor (see Table 4).  
Table 2 
Mean adjustment by anchor 
Anchor Mean N Std. Deviation 
Low (100) 51.88 73 27.33 
High (30) 11.28 65 7.87 
Total 32.75 138 28.90 
 
Table 3 
Mean adjustment by group 
Group Mean N Std. Deviation 
Ingroup 35.77 77 30.20 
Outgroup 28.95 61 26.93 
Total 32.75 138 28.90 
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Table 4 
Mean magnitude of adjustment by condition 
Group Anchor Mean Std. Deviation 
Ingroup Low (100) 57.58 26.49 
 High (30) 12.19 8.08 
Outgroup Low (100) 44.97 27.12 
 High (30) 10.07 7.56 
 
Testing the Hypotheses with a More Focused Approach 
 In order to take a closer look at how anchor and group effect the magnitude of 
adjustment, a series of independent samples t-tests was performed to directly test of my 
hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 was tested by comparing the mean magnitude of adjustment from a 
negative anchor (low anchor) between the ingroup and outgroup conditions. The mean 
adjustment from the anchor was significantly different between the ingroup and outgroup 
conditions, t(71) = 2.00, p = .049, d = .47. Hypothesis 1 was supported, as those who viewed an 
anchor that negatively portrayed their ingroup adjusted higher from the anchor than those who 
viewed an anchor that negatively portrayed their outgroup. 
Hypothesis 2 examined whether those who were given an anchor that reflected the 
ingroup positively would adjust closer to the anchor than when given the same information about 
an outgroup. This was not supported, t(63) = 1.08, p = .29, d = .27.  
 Finally, an independent samples t-test was conducted to test whether participants who 
were given an anchor that reflected their ingroup positively adjusted closer to the given anchor 
than participants who were given an anchor that reflected a negative status. Hypothesis 3 was 
supported, t(10.34) = 9.99,  p < .001, d = 2.32.  
Ingroup Identification as A Moderator 
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In order to test the hypothesized moderation effect of ingroup identification on the 
relationship between type of anchor and magnitude of adjustment from the anchor, Hayes’ 
(2018) PROCESS macro (Model 1) was used to generate 5,000 bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of the conditional effect. Ingroup identification was determined using an average of the 
three measures of ingroup identification - the Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self (IIS; Tropp & 
Wright, 2001), Ingroup Identification Measure (Hall & Crisp, 2008), and the Social 
Identification Questionnaire (Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012). The condition to which 
participants were assigned negatively predicted how much they adjusted from the anchor (B = -
10.62, p < .001).  Ingroup identification did not significantly predict how they adjusted from the 
anchor (B = .81, p = .79).  The relationship between type of anchor and how far an individual 
adjusts from an anchor was not significantly moderated by ingroup identification (B = -3.7, ΔR2 
= .01, F(1, 134) = 1.51, p = .221). The fact that ingroup identification was not a moderator in the 
relationship between the type of anchor viewed and the adjustment away from the anchor says 
that the extent to which an individual identifies with their ingroup does not affect the anchoring 
an adjustment process.  
Exploratory Analyses  
 In addition to the previously discussed analyses, an overall correlation analysis was 
conducted to explore how different trait measures may have correlated with magnitude of 
adjustment and what other patterns emerged from the trait measures (see Table 5). Several 
significant correlations emerged. As expected, the measures of ingroup identification were 
highly correlated, suggesting that they were consistent in measuring the same concept. Most 
relevant to this research, self-enhancing and self-protective behaviors were negatively correlated 
with magnitude of adjustment: the more an individual engaged in these behaviors, the less the 
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adjusted from the anchor r(75) = -.18,  p = .04. Self-concept clarity was marginally correlated 
with the magnitude of adjustment, such that those higher in self-concept clarity adjusted less than 
those who have lower self-concept clarity, r(75) = -.17, p = .05. Trait self-esteem was highly 
negatively correlated with ingroup identification, r(75) = -.24, p = .01. This suggests that those 
who are higher in self-esteem may feel less of a need to identify with their ingroup. Social 
desirability correlated with ingroup identification measures such that individuals seeking to be 
socially desirable identified more strongly with their ingroup than those who did not, r(75) = .21, 
p = .01. A relationship between social desirability and self-esteem was also present, reflecting 
that those who seek to be socially desirable tend to have lower trait self-esteem r(75) = .20, p = 
.02. Self-concept clarity was very highly correlated with self-enhancement and self-protection, 
showing that those who have a clear sense of themselves are more likely to engage in self-
enhancing and self-protecting behaviors r(75) = -.18, p = .04. The strongest association observed 
was that between self-enhancing and self-protecting behaviors and self-concept clarity r(75) = 
.99, p < .001.  
 A correlational analysis was run for only the participants in the ingroup condition to 
better understand what self-related traits were correlated with how much they adjusted from the 
given anchor. Most notably, those who were in the ingroup condition showed significant 
negative correlations between ingroup identification and self-esteem, r = -.34, p < .001 (See 
Table 6). That is, those with higher self-esteem had lower ingroup identification. As this study 
would benefit from more participants, these results are likely underpowered and need further 
data collection in order to obtain the most accurate responses.  
 
 
THE EFFECTS OF INGROUP  26 
Table 5 
Correlation of Trait and Outcome Measures 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Magnitude of 
Adjustment 
- 
     
Ingroup Identification .07 - 
    
Self-Enhancement -.18* .10 - 
   
Social Desirability .09 .21* .01 - 
  
Self-Concept Clarity -.17* .08 .99** -.01 - 
 
Self-Esteem -.11 -.24** -0.05 -.20* -.00 - 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  
 
Table 6     
Ingroup Correlations     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Magnitude of 
Adjustment 
-      
Ingroup Identification .21 -     
Self-Enhancement -.20 0.14 -    
Social Desirability .12 .29* .01 -   
Self-Concept Clarity -.20 .12 .99** -.02 
 
-  
Self-Esteem -.09 -.34** -.05 -.22 -.02 - 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).       
 
Discussion 
 In Hypothesis 1, I predicted that individuals who were given an anchor that negatively 
reflected the reputation of their ingroup would adjust farther from an anchor than those who were 
given an anchor that negatively reflected the reputation of their outgroup. Hypothesis 3 stated 
that those who saw an anchor that positively reflected their ingroup would adjust closer to the 
anchor than those who saw information that negatively reflected their ingroup. Both of these 
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hypotheses were supported. In Hypothesis 2, I predicted that that were given an anchor that 
positively reflected their ingroup would adjust more than those who were given an anchor that 
positively reflected an outgroup. This was not supported. Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants 
who viewed a positive anchor that pertained to their ingroup would adjust less than those who 
viewed an anchor that portrayed their group negatively. This hypothesis was found to be 
supported. Taken together, this suggests that some anchors may serve as a threat to one’s 
collective self. As with other threats to the self, if an individual learns that their ingroup is not 
rated as highly as they may like to believe, they may engage in self-enhancing behaviors. In this 
case, individuals compensate by adjusting to a value that enhances the reputation of the 
collective self. In short, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic is not simply a cold, cognitive 
process: the magnitude of adjustment is amenable to motivational and/or emotional processes.  
 Hypothesis 2 examined whether those who were given an anchor that reflected the 
ingroup positively would adjust closer to the anchor than when given the same information about 
an outgroup. This hypothesis was not supported. That is to say, those who viewed an anchor 
about their ingroup adjusted more than those who viewed an anchor about their outgroup. This 
finding may indicate that individuals will go to greater lengths to enhance their ingroup 
regardless of how an anchor, even a positive one, portrays their group. 
Limitations 
Although Hypothesis 3 is supported by these findings, this difference may be due to the 
fact that those in the high anchor condition (30) simply did not have as much room to adjust as 
those in the low anchor condition (100). This result may also only reflect the main effect of type 
of anchor found in the two-way analysis of variance.   
Explaining the Lack of Moderation Effects 
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Interestingly, the results from Study 1b did not support Hypothesis 4, that there would be 
a moderation effect of ingroup identification. In other words, how strongly someone identified 
with their in-group did not influence how much individuals adjusted away from an anchor that 
represents their ingroup. Even though previous research has shown that individuals who identify 
most with their ingroup show more ingroup bias, the effect of the anchor found in these studies is 
not influenced by how much an individual identifies with their ingroup. It is possible that the 
ingroup of being a student at VCU was not a powerful enough social identity to elicit the 
proposed effects. 
Several associations emerged in trait measures and magnitude of adjustment within the 
entire sample. Firstly, there was correlation between self-enhancing and self-protecting behaviors 
and how much an individual adjusted from the anchor. Specifically, the more of these behaviors 
an individual engages in, the less they adjusted from the anchor. Future research in self factors in 
the adjustment process will focus more on these behaviors in order to understand what 
underlying traits and mechanisms lie behind this connection. Self-concept clarity was also 
negatively correlated with adjustment. It is possible that this connection is driven by higher 
understanding of one’s self outside of group identity, thus removing motivation from adjustment. 
Self-esteem and ingroup identification were strongly negatively correlated both in the overall 
analysis and specifically in the correlational analysis of the participants in the ingroup condition. 
This is surprising as the Balanced Identity Framework (Greenwald et al., 2002), a well-
established framework, directly connects self-esteem and ingroup identity. Within this 
framework, ingroup identification leads to higher self-esteem. This negative correlation implores 
future research. Self-esteem was also linked to social desirability. This association also conflicts 
with past research, which has only found weak associations between the two (Huang, 2013). 
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These findings may reflect that those who have higher self-esteem may not feel the need to be 
socially desirable as such social transgressions may not have as much of an effect on high self-
esteem individuals. The strongest correlation in this study was between self-enhancing and self-
protective behaviors and self-concept clarity. These two factors were nearly perfectly correlated 
which may be indicative that the measures used for the respective variables were measuring 
similar concepts. Possibly, if other measures were used, such collinearity may not have emerged.  
Taken together, these results suggest that if an anchor is related to an individual’s 
ingroup, it will influence how far they will adjust from the given anchor. An important question 
remains whether any type of group, newly formed or already established, can influence how an 
individual chooses to anchor to a given value. In other words, do individuals only react strongly 
to anchors when it is an established group with which they identify, or can similar effects be 
observed in novel ingroups? 
Overview of Study 2 
The goal of Study 2 was to replicate the findings of Study 1b in the context of a novel 
and arbitrary ingroup. Using the same theoretical and methodological frameworks as Study 1b, 
Study 2 explored how similar group processes may emerge in novel groups. By using novel 
groups, the hypotheses of Study 1b may be more robustly tested by removing any possible 
confounds that may be present in previously formed groups. Stated differently, existing group 
identities such as a school identity, may have particular characteristics that also influence 
judgments. I propose utilizing a new and arbitrary group identity will enable a stronger test of 
my hypotheses.  
Minimal Group Paradigm 
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Social Identification Theory suggests that ingroup context shape nearly all social 
cognition (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social cognition is not only affected by established ingroups 
such as racial and ethnic groups but can also be affected by arbitrarily defined ingroups. 
Historically, this has been manipulated via the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970). In the 
paradigm, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament (1971) found that participants favored their own 
group when being asked to distribute money, even when the individual had been assigned to their 
group arbitrarily. For example, may have been assigned a group based on their taste in art 
(Tajfel, Billing, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), random assignment (e.g. Petersen & Blank, 2003; 
Harstone & Augostinos, 1995), and even a coin flip (Billing & Tajfel, 1973).  
More recently, in vivo behavioral tracking (IBT; Halberstadt et al., 2016) was used to 
explore how this phenomenon occurs in real time. Jackson et al. (2019) gave participants either 
yellow or blue name tags in order to create minimal groups. They used IBT to track how 
participants moved in a large open area when told to create their own groups and found that 
participants with the same color name tags tended to group together, increasingly so in 
subsequent trials. Their work suggests that not only does ingroup preference occur with novel 
groups, the preference grows stronger over time.  
In addition to strengthening self-reported attitudes and behavior, the minimal group 
paradigm has also been shown to shift implicit, or automatic, evaluations about the ingroup and 
outgroup. Implicit evaluations occur quickly, like System 2 in dual processing theory, and can 
occur even without awareness. Xiao and Bavel (2019) assigned participants to novel groups and 
later in the experiment switched the participant’s provided ingroups. Using implicit and self-
report measures, they found that participants implicit preferences quickly adapted to information 
regarding their former group and current group. These findings are particularly impressive given 
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that implicit attitudes are known to be much slower and resistant to change than explicit 
attitudes, thus showing the profound effect of the minimal group paradigm. Though the minimal 
group paradigm has been well studied, there have been a few criticisms offered (CITATION).  
Because previous research has shown that two, and not more than two, groups create the 
strongest effect for the minimal group paradigm (Harstone & Augoustinos, 1995), participants 
were told that they have been randomly assigned to the Yellow Team where they were 
competing against the Green Team in a subsequent task. Participants were told that their score 
the task contributed to the overall Yellow Team score. After completing the task, participants 
were shown either an anchor that positively reflects their ingroup performance or an anchor that 
negatively reflects their ingroup performance. Participants were also be presented with anchors 
that describe the outgroup as positively or negatively. Participants were then asked to estimate 
the actual score for their team and complete the same measures as in Study 1b.  
The following hypotheses were tested and are identical to Study 1 hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: When shown an anchor that threatens the reputation of one’s novel 
ingroup (i.e., a low anchor), individuals would adjust more from the given anchor than 
those who are shown the same anchor about an outgroup.  
• Hypothesis 2: When shown an anchor that supports the reputation of one’s novel ingroup 
(i.e., a high anchor), individuals would adjust closer to the given anchor and adjust less 
than those who are shown the same anchor about an outgroup.  
• Hypothesis 3: Those who are shown an anchor that supports the reputation of their 
ingroup will adjust closer to the anchor than those who are shown an anchor that 
threatens the reputation of their ingroup. 
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• Hypothesis 4: Self-enhancement would moderate the magnitude of adjustment from the 
anchor. Individuals who, at a trait level, are more likely to engage in self-enhancement 
would show a larger magnitude of adjustment away from the anchor when shown 
information that threatens their group and those that are shown information that enhances 
their novel ingroup would adjust even closer to the anchor.  
Methods 
Participants 
As in Study 1b, participants were undergraduate students in introductory psychology 
classes at Virginia Commonwealth University recruited through the SONA system. Based on 
previous social identity and minimal group paradigm literature (Xiao & Van Bavel, 2019), this 
research anticipated a modest Cohen’s d = .3. An a priori power analysis revealed that 126 
participants were needed for adequate power (G-Power 3; (G-Power 3.1; Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2007) and 150 participants were recruited. Sixty-five participants’ data were 
excluded because they did not follow instructions properly and did not adjust from the given 
anchor in the correct direction3, leaving 85 participants (mean age = 21.70 years). Of the 
participants, 36.5% of participants identified as men, 60.0% identified as women, 1.3% identified 
as transgender, and 1.2% identified as non-binary. In terms of racial diversity, 47.6% identified 
as White, 16.7% identified as Asian, 16.7% identified as Black or African American, 1.2% 
identified as Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. Additionally, 11.9% of participants were 
multiracial and 6.0% preferred not to report their race.   
Design 
 
3 This refers to providing an estimate lower the given anchor rather than higher than the given anchor.  over the 
given anchor. For example, some participants were told that their team earned over 75 points. Adjusting in the 
wrong direction would be providing an estimate below 75, such as 65, rather than 85 which would be in the correct 
direction.  
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Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions using a 2 (Group: Ingroup, 
Outgroup) x 2 (Anchor: High, Low) between-subjects design. In this study, participants were 
told that they have been randomly assigned to be a member of the Yellow Team (i.e., ingroup) 
and that they were competing against the Green Team (i.e., outgroup). The second factor 
included either a low or high anchor for their team’s score to elicit either a negative or positive 
team performance. The high anchor presented the group as high-performing whereas the low 
anchor is meant to present the group as low-performing.  
Procedure 
As with Study 1b, I recruited participants via the SONA system; the study was conducted 
online. Participants were told that the study examined teamwork and competition and that they 
were going to compete on a team with two other players against another team of three 
participants. In order to make participants believe that there were other people in their session of 
the experiment, they were shown a screen that indicated how many participants had joined. This 
screen showed a participant joining every few seconds, and once the screen showed that all 
participants had been added, it automatically advanced to the screen that explained how the 
groups would be decided after 3 seconds. They were then told that they would be assigned to 
either the Yellow Team or the Green Team depending on the result of a random number 
generator. All participants received the number 4 and were told that since their number was even, 
they were assigned to the Yellow Team. Once assigned to their team, participants were then 
shown the following information about the point system of the word game that they would 
complete as a part of the competition: 
Please complete the following word task comprised of 15 items. Each item is worth 2 
points, making a perfect individual score worth 30 points. Each team gets a base of 10 points. 
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Each of the Yellow team members' scores will contribute to the overall score team score, making 
a perfect team score worth 100 points. You will not be shown your individual score. Each 
participant will have 5 minutes to complete this task. 
After receiving these instructions, participants completed a 25-item Remote Associates 
Test (RAT; Mednick, 1968). Participants then completed the anchoring activity as well as 
several questionnaires. 
Anchoring Activity 
In the anchoring activity, participants in the high anchor (positively reflects the ingroup) 
condition were told that their team earned an overall score of above 70. Participants in the low 
anchor condition were told that their team earned an overall score of above 30. Participants in 
each condition were then asked to estimate the actual score. See Appendix M for a complete 
description of the anchoring activity.  
Questionnaires 
  Participants were also asked to complete the same series of randomized trait 
questionnaires (e.g., self-enhancement) and ingroup identification measures utilized in Study 1b 
as well as the demographic questionnaire utilized in Study 1b.  
Measures 
Verbal Task 
Remote Associates Test. The Remote Associates Test (RAT; Mednick, 1968) was used as 
the activity in which participants are told that each correct answer increases their team’s (and 
ingroup) score by one point. This scale was originally used to measure creativity but was not 
used for any trait measures in this study. Respondents are asked to identify the word that 
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connects a series of three word. An example item is “cream/skate/water” with the correct answer 
being “ice” (ice cream, ice skate, ice water). For the full activity, see Appendix O. 
Trait Measures 
Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (SES; Rosenberg, 1989) is a 10-item scale 
that assesses an individual’s self-esteem. Sample items include “I feel that I have a number of 
good qualities” and “I take a positive attitude toward myself.” Respondents rate each item on a 
4-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 4 = Strongly Agree).  
Narcissism. Single-Item Narcissism Scale (SINS; Konrath, Meier, & Bushman, 2014) is a 
well-validated, one item scale to assess narcissism, Participants are given a short definition of a 
narcissist and are asked to respond to the following statement; “To what extent do you consider 
yourself a narcissist?” on a 7-point scale (1 = not very true of me, 7 = very true of me).  
Social Desirability. Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1999) 
is a 40-item scale designed to assesses an individual’s feelings about social desirability. It is 
composed of two subscales – Self-Deception Enhancement and Impression Management. 
Sample items from the Self-Deception Enhancement and Impression Management subscales 
include “I am a completely rational person” and “Once in a while I laugh at a dirty joke”, 
respectively. This scale utilizes a 7-point Likert-type scale (1 = Totally Disagree, 7 = Totally 
Agree).  
Self-Enhancement and Protection. The Self-Affirming Reflections and Defensiveness 
subscales of the Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection scale (Hepper, Gramzow, & Sedikides, 
2010) was used to assess how individuals react to statements that affirm the self and defend 
against attacks to the self. The Self-Affirming Reflections subscale consists of six items while 
the Defensiveness subscale consists of 18 items. Respondents are asked to consider if the 
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patterns and thoughts described in the items are activities that they engage in and how typical 
these actions are of them. Sample items from the Self-Affirming Reflections subscale include “In 
times of stress, thinking about your positive close relationships and loved ones” and “When you 
do poorly at something, reminding yourself of your values and what matters to you.” The 
Defensiveness subscale includes items such as “Revising very little for a test or going out the 
night before an exam or appraisal at work, so that if you do poorly, it would not mean you are 
incompetent.” Respondents use a 6-point Likert-type scale (1= not at all characteristic of me, 6 = 
very characteristic of me).  
Self-Concept Clarity. Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC; Campbell et al., 1996) assesses 
the extent to which an individual’s beliefs about their self are clear, stable, and internally 
consistent. The scale is comprised of 12 items including “My beliefs about myself often conflict 
with one another” and “Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I would tell someone what I’m really 
like.” Responses are measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 5 = 
Strongly Agree).  
Demographics 
Demographic Questionnaire. Participants were finally asked to respond to questions 
regarding their age, gender identity, racial identity, and ethnic identity.  
     Results 
Calculation of Magnitude of Adjustment 
In order to calculate the magnitude of adjustment from the anchor, the absolute value of 
the mean adjustment from each condition was subtracted from the corresponding anchor4. In this 
study, there was an issue of participants not following directions properly. Many participants 
 
4 The calculation of magnitude of adjustment in Study 2 different the calculation in Study 1 as higher numbers 
reflect a higher score in Study 2 while lower numbers reflect a higher ranking in Study 1.  
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adjusted in the opposite direction the instructions indicated (e.g. a participant estimates 48 when 
told that their team had earned over 75 points). These estimates were still subtracted from the 
anchor to result in a negative magnitude of adjustment.   
Participants who viewed information that positively portrayed their ingroup (Yellow 
Team) adjusted an average of 27.76 points higher than the anchor (SD = 36.43) while those who 
viewed information that negatively portrayed their ingroup adjusted an average of 33 points 
lower than the anchor (SD = 20.87). On the other hand, those who viewed the positive anchor 
about their outgroup (Green Team) adjusted a mean of 29.33 points higher than the anchor (SD 
=27.11) and those who viewed the negative anchor adjusted an average of 34 points lower than 
the anchor.  
Anchoring Effects 
In order to detect the presence of anchoring effects, the mean estimate of each anchor 
level (low and high) were compared. Participants that were in the high anchor condition (75) 
estimated a mean of 81.46, 6.46 points from the anchor, whereas those who were in the low 
anchor condition (25) estimated a mean score of 46.13, 16.13 points from the anchor (See Table 
7). As in Study 1, mean estimate significantly differed between the two anchors t(83) = 14.79, p 
< .001. Taken together, these results confirm that these anchors successfully replicated the 
anchoring effect.  
 
Table 7 
Mean Estimate by Anchor 
Anchor N Mean Std. Deviation 
High (75) 37 81.46 4.71 
Low (25) 48 46.13 13.91 
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The Effects of Anchor and Group on Adjustment 
A two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to investigate the effects 
of ingroup threat on the magnitude of adjustment away from an anchor, specifically within the 
context of the minimal group paradigm. As in Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of four conditions with the independent variables being the type of anchor (negatively or 
positively reflecting the performance of the respective group) and type of group (ingroup vs. 
outgroup). Participants were all told that they would be competing on the Yellow team (the novel 
ingroup) and against the Green team (novel outgroup). Consistent with Study 1 there was a 
significant main effect of the type of anchor F(1,83) = 36.52, p < .001, partial η2 = .31, 
suggesting that participants adjusted to different degrees depending on whether the anchor was 
low or high. There was no main effect of group F(1,83) = .83, p = .36, partial η2 = .01, thus 
failing to support hypothesis that there would be a different in adjustment between adjustment in 
participants who viewed an anchor regarding their ingroup and outgroup. There was also no 
interaction between the type of anchor and group, F(1,83) = .92, p = .34, partial η2 = .01 
reflecting that the adjustment from the anchor was not affected uniquely by both the type of 
group and type of anchor (See Table 8).  
Table 8 
Mean adjustment from anchor by condition 
 
 
 
Anchor Group Mean Std. Deviation 
Low Anchor (25) Ingroup 18.68 13.98  
Outgroup 23.19 13.78 
High Anchor (75) Ingroup 6.50 3.68  
Outgroup 6.41 5.82 
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Testing the Hypotheses with a More Focused Approach 
In order to directly test my hypotheses, a series of independent samples t-tests were 
performed. Hypothesis 1 was tested by comparing the mean magnitude of adjustment from a 
negative anchor (low anchor) between the ingroup and outgroup conditions. The mean 
adjustment from the low anchor (e.g., exposure to a threatening the status of the group) was not 
significantly different between the ingroup and outgroup conditions, t(46) = -1.12, p = .27, d = 
.32.  
Hypothesis 2, that those who were given an anchor that reflected the group positively 
would adjust less than when given the same information about an outgroup. This hypothesis was 
not supported t(35) = 0.06, p = .96, d = .02. Therefore, participants who viewed an anchor 
positively reflecting their ingroup adjusted similarly to those who viewed the same anchor about 
an outgroup. 
 Finally, an independent samples t-test revealed that revealed that individuals who read a 
positive anchor about their ingroup adjusted less than those who received a negative anchor 
about their ingroup, t(24.16) = 12.23, p <.001, d = 2.32. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was supported.  
 
Self-Enhancement as A Moderator 
The hypothesized moderation effect of self-enhancing and self-protecting behaviors on 
the relationship between type of anchor and magnitude of adjustment from the anchor. Hayes’ 
(2018) PROCESS macro (Model 1) was used to generate 5,000 bootstrapped confidence 
intervals of the conditional effect. The condition to which participants were assigned did not 
predict how much they adjusted from the anchor (B = .63, p = .92). Self-enhancing and self-
protecting behaviors did not significantly predict how they adjusted from the anchor (B = 2.06, p 
= .71).  The relationship between type of anchor and how far an individual adjusts from an 
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anchor was not significantly moderated by self-protecting and self-enhancing behaviors (B = 
1.13, ΔR2 = .00, F(1, 80) = .77, p = .58).  
Exploratory Analyses 
 In addition to the previously discussed analyses, a correlational analysis was conducted to 
explore how different trait measures may have correlated with magnitude of adjustment and what 
other patterns emerged from the trait measures (see Table 9 for details). The only significant 
correlation that emerged was between the magnitude of adjustment and self-concept clarity. 
Those higher in self-concept clarity adjusted closer to the anchor, r (85) = -.24, p = .03. The 
same effect was found in Study 1. In the ingroup correlational analysis, there were no significant 
correlations found between the self-related trait measures and the magnitude of adjustment (See 
Table 10). As with Study 1, these results are underpowered and would be more definitive with 
more data.  
Table 9 
Correlation of Trait and Outcome Measures 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1. Self-Enhancing and Self-
Protecting 
- 
    
2. Social Desirability -.01 - 
   
3. Self-Esteem -.06 .18 - 
  
4. Self  -.09 .01 -.17 - 
 
5. Magnitude of Adjustment -.05 .01 .05 -.24* - 
 
 *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 10 
Ingroup Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. Self-Esteem -          
2. Self-Continuity 0.21 -        
3. Social Desirability 0.13 .345*  -     
4, Self-Enhancing and Self-Protecting -0.245 -0.297 -0.152  -   
5. Magnitude of Adjustment -0.203 -0.143 -0.039 0.285 -  
 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Discussion 
In Hypothesis 1 of this study, I predicted that individuals who were given an anchor that 
negatively reflected the reputation of their ingroup would adjust farther from an anchor than 
those who were given an anchor that negatively reflected the reputation of their outgroup. In 
Hypothesis 2, I predicted that that were given an anchor that positively reflected their ingroup 
would adjust less than those who were given an anchor that positively reflected their outgroup. 
Hypothesis 3, that those who saw an anchor that positively reflected their ingroup would adjust 
closer to the anchor than those who saw information that negatively reflected their ingroup. Out 
of those three hypotheses, only Hypothesis 3 was supported, reflected in a main effect of anchor 
type. There was no interaction, showing that there was not a unique effect of both type of anchor 
and group on how much a person adjusts from an anchor. Hypothesis 4, that self-enhancement 
would moderate the findings, was not supported. These findings support the results of Study 1 in 
suggesting that if an anchor is related to the perception of an individual’s ingroup, it will 
influence how they adjust from the anchor.  
Limitations 
This study had two major limitations, one being an issue with the anchor values and the 
other being the minimal groups possibly not eliciting ingroup effects. Although Hypothesis 3 
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was supported by the findings, this difference in adjustment between high and low anchors in the 
ingroup condition may be due to the fact that those in the high anchor condition (75) did not have 
as much room to adjust as those in the low anchor condition (25). This result may also simply 
reflect the main effect of type of anchor found in the two-way analysis of variance.   
The other major limitation to this study is that the novel ingroup likely did not show the 
same effect as a more deeply ingrained ingroup, such as a racial group or political party. 
Although the minimal group paradigm is a long-held paradigm, it has been criticized as being an 
oversimplification of more complex processes (Schiffmann & Wicklund, 1992). Major criticisms 
include not taking other psychological factors into account such as self-esteem and self-
enhancement and the assumption that individuals will adopt any identity (Schiffmann & 
Wicklund, 1992). There are also several moderators that affect an individual’s adherence to 
novel ingroup that have not necessarily been taken into consideration such as self-esteem 
(Peterson & Blank, 2003), group status (Rechl, 1998), and group identity salience (Leonardelli & 
Brewer, 2001). In addition to these issues, most minimal group research has been done using 
majority White, college-aged samples, thus bringing the paradigm’s generalizability into 
question.  
General Discussion 
Findings 
Two experiments examined the possible effects of ingroup threat on the anchoring 
adjustment heuristic. This effect was first studied using students at Virginia Commonwealth 
University with the VCU community serving as the ingroup. A fictional outgroup, Turlington 
State University was used as a control in Study 1. College rankings provided the support or 
denigration of the ingroup. Participants were either shown an anchor that positively or negatively 
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reflected their ingroup or outgroup. Analyses showed that whether the anchor was positive or 
negative affected how participants adjusted from the anchor. Whether the anchor was about the 
ingroup or the outgroup also affected how participants adjusted from the anchor. Ingroup 
identification did not serve as a moderator in the relationship between type of anchor and 
magnitude of adjustment.  
In this study, support or denigration of the ingroup was represented with the amount of 
points each team earned in the game. As with Study 1b, the level of the anchor (positive or 
negative) significantly affected the magnitude of adjustment from the anchor. Results did not 
reveal a significant effect of the group that the anchor represented, nor was there a significant 
interaction between group and level of anchor. The proposed moderation of self-enhancing 
behaviors on the relationship between anchor presented and magnitude of adjustment was not 
significant.  
These results suggest that the magnitude of the anchor presented effected how much an 
individual adjusts from an anchor, though only Study 1b supports the idea that an anchor tied to 
one’s identity affects the adjustment process. Assuming that the effect of the subject of the 
anchor exists, it is possible to reason that Study 2 did not yield the same results as Study 1 
because the ingroup effects of the minimal group paradigm were not strong enough to elicit the 
proposed effect. Past research has shown replicability issues with the paradigm, with ingroup 
bias not being elicited by the novel ingroup (Carini, 2000). Perhaps more ingrained groups, such 
as political parties and sports fans, would exhibit a stronger effect.  
Interesting patterns emerged within the trait measures collected. Both self-concept clarity 
and self-enhancement and self-protection behaviors were negatively correlated with how much 
an individual adjusted from the anchor. This suggests that higher one’s self-concept clarity and 
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the more self-enhancing and protecting behaviors they engage in, the less they deviated from the 
anchor. As there is not much existing work on self-protection and enhancement, self-concept 
clarity, and the anchoring and adjustment heuristics, future work could examine these factors 
more fully.  
A negative correlation between self-esteem and ingroup identification was also 
uncovered. This finding does not align with the previously established Balanced Identity 
Framework (Greenwald et al., 2002) which posits that ingroup bias leads to identification, then 
leading to high self-esteem. It could be that this negative correlation is a result of the chosen 
ingroup, VCU. That is to say, individuals may not have as closely identified with VCU as had a 
more specific group been chosen that reflects their self-concept.  
Though I examined correlations between in-group and out-group conditions, my studies 
were under powered. Thus, recruiting additional participants, particularly for Study 1b, may 
yield more substantial findings. 
Limitations 
Studies 1a and 1b  
 In Study 1a, the participants were asked to estimate the state-wide rank of the two 
schools, Virginia Commonwealth University and Turlington State University. The results of this 
pilot showed that participants estimated VCU to be ranked much higher than TSU and these 
results were used to determine the anchors used in Study 1b. The difference in average ranking 
may have not been as unbiased and diagnostic as I had hoped due to the fact that the estimations 
of each university were not counter-balanced. All participants were asked to rank VCU before 
they ranked TSU. This may have caused participants to use their estimate of VCU’s ranking as 
an anchor to estimate TSU’s ranking. Similarly, the adjustment from the anchors in Studies 1a 
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and 1b may have been due to the fact that participants were familiar with VCU but unfamiliar 
with TSU. Due to this familiarity, participants may have ranked VCU higher simply because it’s 
a well-known university and assumed that TSU was not a high-performing university because 
they had never heard of the school or any of its accolades.  
Study 2 
As discussed in the previous section, only an arbitrarily defined ingroup was examined in 
this study and the minimal group paradigm has several shortcomings. Groups that are more 
important to an individual’s self-concept may show a more pronounced effect. For example, a 
future study may choose to examine one’s adjustment to anchors related to political 
identification and beliefs. When faced with statistics that pertain to political issues, an individual 
may perceive them differently depending on their party. For example, if a conservative 
individual viewed a statistic such as “Over 45% of Virginians are in favor of gun control”, they 
may estimate the true percentage to be much higher than 45% than would a liberal in favor of 
gun control. 
The difficulty of the Remote Associate’s Task (RAT; Mednick, 1968) may have affected 
the rankings in that participants felt that they did not perform well on the task and assumed that 
their teammates also did not perform well. This could be due to how individuals tend to anchor 
on their own performance to postulate how other individuals performed on the task (Kruger, 
1999). Especially if participants were displaying the “better-than-average effect” in which 
individuals assume that they have performed better than their peers. Even if participants 
displayed the “worse-than-average” effect, they could still believe that their peers had only done 
marginally better than them or even scored points whereas the participant did not. If this was the 
case, they may have assumed that they did not do well, therefore, their teammates must have 
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performed even worse. A question asking participants how they believed they performed on the 
task would have leant insight on how their perception of their performance could have influenced 
their estimates.  
Overall  
Both studies were under-powered, as several participants had to be dropped due to 
noncompliance with the directions given. These participants estimated outside of the range 
suggested by the instructions (e.g. being told that VCU was ranked above 100 and then 
estimating that VCU was ranked 158 or being told that the Yellow team earned over 75 points 
and estimating that the team earned 60 points). It is possible that the wording of the instructions 
may have caused this issue and should have been piloted at the beginning of these studies. Due to 
the loss of several participants, both Study 1b and Study 2 would benefit from additional 
recruitment to increase power to detect a small effect.  
Another issue that may have affected results is the fact that individuals were limited in 
their estimation. The high and low anchors allowed for varying degrees of adjustment. Those in 
high anchor conditions had fewer integers to use as estimates than those in the low anchor 
conditions, possibly causing the difference in magnitude of adjustment in the high and low 
anchor conditions rather than any effects of the anchor. 
As with most psychology studies, these studies also suffered from a fairly young mean 
age, with the mean age of participants in Study 1 being 18.98 and Study 2 being 21.70. Even if 
the hypothesized effects were found, they may not generalize to other age groups. For example, 
group identity and understanding likely varies through the lifespan. In young children, these 
effects would not be observed simply because they may not have developed these understandings 
of group identities.  
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Future Directions 
Most immediately, future work could examine the same hypotheses of this work but with 
methods that address the limitations of these studies. A different presentation of the anchor could 
mitigate issues with non-adherence to the directions. Using Study 1’s protocol as an example, 
participants asked if they believed that VCU was ranked higher or lower than a particular rank 
and then asked to estimate its actual rank. The threatening and enhancing anchors could be 
presented using a wheel as with the original Kahneman and Tversky experiment (1974). With bi-
directional instructions, participants would not be able to adjust in the wrong direction. 
The possible effects of self and group processes on the anchoring and adjustment 
heuristic should also be explored in different age groups and cultural groups should also be 
examined. Though this effect may be present in adulthood where one’s self-concept is more 
developed, it may not work in the same manner in developing children and adolescents. If this 
effect is truly generalizable, it should be present in all stages of development where ingroup 
processes are present. Moreover, considering more central identities such as race, gender, and 
political party should also be examined. Whereas this program of research explored lightly 
bound and novel ingroups, these more central identities may lend to stronger results and have 
greater real-world implications.   
Applications 
 The findings of this research could lend more insight on ingroup and outgroup functions 
that may be the driving mechanisms behind disparities within communities, especially in the 
United  issues such as racial disparities in pain treatment and punishment of students in public 
schools where students of color are more likely to be suspended than their White counterparts. 
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Appendix A 
1.  Please rate how you feel about Virginia Commonwealth University/ Turlington State 
University? 
o Strongly Dislike 
o Dislike 
o Neutral 
o Like 
o Strongly Like 
2. Before participating in this study, were you familiar with college ratings? 
o Yes 
o No 
3. Before participating in this study, were you familiar with Virginia Commonwealth 
University/ Turlington State University’s ranking? 
o Yes 
o No 
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Appendix B: 
Student Information Questionnaire 
1. Please select your student classification 
o Freshman 
o Sophomore 
o Junior 
o Senior 
2. How many years have you been a student at VCU? 
o 1  
o 2 
o 3 
o 4 
o 5 
o 6 
o 7+ 
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Appendix C 
Study 1 Manipulation 
Manipulations by Condition in Study 1 
A top American business magazine releases an annual ranking of 4-year colleges and 
universities every year. This annual ranking is broken down by state so that each institution is 
ranked against other institutions in the same state.  
Ingroup High Anchor Condition 
There are 171 colleges and universities in VA. With 1 being the best institution and 171 being 
the worst institution in VA, VCU is ranked in the top 30. What do you think VCU's actual 
rank is? (Please respond with a whole number) 
 Ingroup Low Anchor Condition 
There are 171 colleges and universities in VA. With 1 being the best institution and 171 being 
the worst institution in VA, VCU is ranked in the top 100. What do you think VCU's actual 
rank is? (Please respond with a whole number) 
Outgroup High Anchor Condition 
There are 171 colleges and universities in the state where Turlington State University is located. 
With 1 being the best institution and 171 being the worst institution in the state, TSU is ranked in 
the top 30. What do you think TSU's actual rank is? (Please respond with a whole number) 
Outgroup Low Anchor Condition 
There are 171 colleges and universities in the state where Turlington State University (TSU) is 
located. With 1 being the best institution and 171 being the worst institution in the state, TSU is 
ranked in the top 100. What do you think TSU's actual rank is? (Please respond with a whole 
number) 
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Appendix D: 
Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale 
Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate 
how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. (1=Strongly Agree, 2=Agree, 
3=Disagree, 4=Strongly Disagree) 
1. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.  
6. I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. 
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Appendix E: 
Single-Item Narcissism Scale 
To what extent do you agree with this statement: "I am a narcissist." (Note: The word 
“narcissist” means egotistical, self-focused, and vain.) 
 _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ _______ 
1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
Not Very True Of Me Very True Of Me 
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Appendix F: 
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding 
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how much 
you agree with it. 
+ _______+ _______+ _______+ _______+ _______+ _______+ 
1               2               3               4               5               6               7 
Totally Disagree                                      Neutral                           Totally Agree 
____  1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right. 
____  2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. 
____  3. Many people I meet are rather stupid. 
____  4. I have not always been honest with myself. 
____  5. I always know why I like things. 
____  6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. 
____  7. Many people think that I am exceptional. 
____  8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. 
____  9. I am fully in control of my own fate. 
____ 10. It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. 
____ 11. I never regret my decisions. 
____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough. 
____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference. 
____ 14. People don’t seem to notice me and my abilities. 
____ 15. I am a completely rational person. 
____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. 
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____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments 
____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. 
____ 19. It's all right with me if some people happen to dislike me. 
____ 20. I’m just an average person. 
____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. 
____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes. 
____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
____ 24. I never swear. 
____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught. 
____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back. 
____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her. 
____ 30. I always declare everything when asked by police or customs officials. 
____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. 
____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. 
____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
____ 35. I have done things that I don't tell other people about. 
____ 36. I never take things that don't belong to me. 
____ 37. I have pretended to be sick to get out of work or school. 
____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it. 
____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. 
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____ 40. I don't gossip about other people's business. 
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Appendix G: 
Self-Enhancement and Self-Protection Strategies Scale - Defensiveness and Self-Affirming 
Reflections Subscales 
In this set of questions, we will list particular patterns of thought, feeling, and behavior that 
people engage in during the course of everyday life.  
For each pattern, we will ask you to consider whether it is something that you yourself engage in, 
and how much it is characteristic or typical of you. 
To what extent is this characteristic or typical of you? 
Response scale: 1 (not at all characteristic of me) to 6 (very characteristic of me) 
1. Thinking of yourself as generally possessing positive personality traits or abilities to a 
greater extent than most people 
2. Thinking of yourself as generally possessing negative personality traits or flaws to a lesser 
extent than most people 
3. Thinking that groups you belong to are generally much better than groups you don't 
belong to (e.g., sports teams or supporters, universities) 
4. Putting down or criticizing groups that you don't belong to (e.g., a rival sports team or 
university) 
5. Working out the kind of person you are by examining your intentions (e.g., "I am 
considerate because I think about how I can help others"), but working out other people 
only by examining their behavior (e.g., "She must be considerate because she helped a 
friend with his work") 
6. Associating yourself with people who are successful –but not more successful than you 
7. Remembering hardships that you had to overcome in order to be really successful 
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8. Thinking about how you have grown and improved as a person over time; how much more 
good/honest/skilled you are now than you used to be 
9. Believing you have control over chance events (e.g., thinking you are more likely than 
others to throw a 6 on a dice, thinking your personally chosen lottery numbers are more 
likely to win than “lucky dip” numbers) 
10. When you do poorly at something or get bad grades, thinking it was due to the situation, 
not your ability (e.g., the exam questions were unfair or too difficult) 
11. When you do poorly at something or get bad grades, thinking it was due to bad luck 
12. When you do poorly at something or get bad grades, thinking that the situation or test was 
uninformative or inaccurate (e.g., thinking the exam was badly designed, or thinking "that 
can't be right") 
13. When you do poorly at something or get bad grades, thinking hard about the situation and 
feedback until you find something wrong with it and can discount it 
14. When you do poorly at something or get bad grades, playing down the importance of that 
ability or area of life 
15. When a group you are part of does well, thinking that you contributed to the success more 
than other members 
16. Defining your moral standards to fit your actions (e.g., believing that it’s ok to cheat in a 
game of cards, keep the extra change the cashier mistakenly gave you, or gossip about an 
acquaintance, because...) 
17. When you do poorly at something, reminding yourself of your other strengths and abilities 
18. In times of stress, reminding yourself of your values and what matters to you 
19. In times of stress, thinking about your positive close relationships and loved ones 
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20. Revising very little for a test, or going out the night before an exam or appraisal at work, 
so that if you do well, it would mean you must have very high ability 
21. Revising very little for a test, or going out the night before an exam or appraisal at work, 
so that if you do poorly, it would not mean you are incompetent 
22. Leaving work until the last minute (and often not getting it done) to avoid the implications 
of doing poorly 
23. Telling other people that you expect to do even more badly than you really expect to do 
(e.g., in work or a sporting event) 
24. Forging friendships with people who are nearly, but not quite as high as you in ability or 
achievement 
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Appendix H: 
Self-Concept Clarity 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. (1=Strongly Agree, 
2=Agree, 3=Disagree, 4=Strongly Disagree) 
1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.  
2. On one day I might have one opinion of myself and on another day, I might have a 
different opinion.  
3. I spend a lot of time wondering about what kind of person I really am.  
4. Sometimes I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be.  
5. When I think about the kind of person I have been in the past, I’m not sure what I was 
really like.  
6. I seldom experience conflict between the different aspects of my personality. 
7. Sometimes I think I know other people better than I know myself.  
8. My beliefs about myself seem to change very frequently.  
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different 
from one day to another day.  
10. Even if I wanted to, I don’t think I would tell someone what I’m really like.  
11. In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am. 
12. It is often hard for me to make up my mind about things because I don’t really know what 
I want.  
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Appendix I: 
Modified Ingroup Identification Measure 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.  
 1 = Not at All, to 9 = Very Much So 
Modified 
1. I identify strongly with other VCU students. 
2. Being a VCU student is an important part of who I am. 
3. I feel strong ties with other VCU students. 
4. I feel a sense of solidarity with other VCU students. 
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Appendix J: 
Modified Social Identification Questionnaire 
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement.  
All questions are rated on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10 with 0 = never/extremely 
marginal/extremely unhappy, 5 = sometimes/intermediate/neutral, and 10 = extremely 
often/extremely central/extremely happy 
1. How loyal do you feel toward VCU? 
2. How often do you show or tell people you are a student at VCU in your everyday 
actions? 
3. How central or marginal is being a student at VCU to your sense of who you are? 
4. How happy or unhappy do you feel about being a student at VCU? 
5. How often do you think about the fact that you are a student at VCU? 
6. How much do you like people to know you are a student at VCU? 
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Appendix K: 
Inclusion of Ingroup in Self (IIS) Questionnaire 
Please circle the picture below that best describes your relationship. 
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Appendix L: 
Final Open-Ended Question 
What do you think was the actual purpose of this study? 
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Appendix M 
Remote Associates Test 
Look at the three words and find a fourth word that is related to all three. 
Example: What word is related to these three words? 
paint; doll; cat 
The answer is "house": house paint, dollhouse, and house cat. 
1. call; pay; line  
2. end; burning, blue  
3. man; hot; sure 
4. stick; pal; ball 
5. bleu; cake; cottage 
6. man; wheel; high 
7. motion; poke; down 
8. line; birthday; surprise 
9. wood; liquor; luck 
10. house; village; golf 
11. plan; show; walker 
12. key; wall; previous 
13. bell; iron; tender 
14. water; youth; soda 
15. base; snow; dance 
16. stop; kart; slow 
17. up; book; charge 
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18. tin; writer; my 
19. leg; arm; person 
20. weight; out; pencil 
21. spin; tip; shape 
22. sharp; tick; tie 
23. out; band; night 
24. cool; house; fat 
25. back; go; light 
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Appendix N 
Manipulations by Condition 
Ingroup High Anchor 
“In this game, the Yellow Team has earned over 70 points out of a possible 100 points. How 
many points do you think your team actually earned in this game?” 
 
Ingroup Low Anchor 
“In this game, the Yellow Team has earned over 30 points out of a possible 100 points.  How 
many points do you think your team actually earned in this game?” 
 
Outgroup High Anchor 
“In this game, the Green Team has earned over 70 points out of a possible 100 points.  How 
many points do you think your team actually earned in this game?” 
 
Outgroup Low Anchor 
“In this game, the Green Team has earned over 30 points out of a possible 100 points.  How 
many points do you think your team actually earned in this game?” 
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